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MONETARY AND FINANCIAL
INTEGRATION IN NORTH AMERICA*
D. SYKES WILFORDt AND W. DAYLE NATTRESS**
INTRODUCTION AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The issue of monetary integration in North America can be viewed from two
perspectives. First, given the three distinct national economies, central banks, and
capital and money markets, one may concentrate on existing structural differences.
On the other hand, when one recognizes the U.S. dollar's role in Mexico, as well as
the substitutability in Canada of various currencies and assets-most importantly
the dollar-one is struck by how well integrated are Canadian, Mexican, and U.S.
financial markets.
These two perspectives of the issue of monetary integration are radically differ-
ent. It is, therefore, essential that any analysis of the monetary integration of
North America begin not only with a discussion of institutional structures of
financial systems, but also with an economic framework within which the founda-
tion of comparison and contrast can have some meaning.
The literature which has been very important in raising the issue of financial
integration is that concerned with the. optimum currency area. This literature ad-
dresses the question of the optimum (geographical) region for a single medium of
exchange and unit of account.'
Various criteria have been offered to determine the optimum currency area.
One suggested criterion is factor mobility. 2 Under this criterion, a high degree of
labor and capital mobility between regions allows, given a common currency, sta-
bilization of income and prices. Another criterion that has been offered is a large
percentage of tradeable goods in a particular area with respect to the area's total
output.3 In this case, a single currency would guard against changes in relative
prices with respect to the country or area with which there is a large volume of
foreign trade.
However, the main reason there exist so many different national currencies is
that each country's government, in a purely nationalistic spirit, considers a monop-
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oly on note issue to be a necessary condition for political independence. A nation-
alized monopoly of currency issuance provides the government an enhanced
ability to tax, spend, and control its destiny (even if such policy is at odds with the
welfare of its constituents). Considering the usefulness of money in even the most
primitive economies, having monopoly power to create money is particularly
tempting to governments since the cost of production is negligible.
4
Much of the optimum currency literature must be examined in light of the
nationalistic spirit of monopoly over money creation. The desire for each govern-
ment to have control over its own destiny is very strong. Throughout North
America this desire is certainly just as strong, but, as the optimum currency litera-
ture indicates, large returns to the general populace may be realized by using mon-
etary policy optimally for a particular geographical area such as North America.
The United States and Canada may be called a "natural currency area" since
their geographical, cultural, trade, and business ties are so strong. Further, it has
been argued that Canada and the United States could be subdivided east to west
as optimal currency areas based upon logical trade patterns." By the same token,
the world has been touted as the optimum currency area. However, given the
implications for interregional adjustment that a world currency would dictate,
other "more optimal" areas of full integration (or one currency) should be ex-
amined.'
Just as examining the possibility of a world currency is pure academic specula-
tion, considering North America as divided into optimal areas cutting across na-
tional boundaries is an exercise in irrelevancy. However, in the larger context of
the world, as well as in North America, many of the benefits (and also the costs) of
monetary integration are presently being obtained despite the continued nationali-
zation of currencies.
In North America, many of the benefits of monetary integration are now re-
ceived by the general populace through powerful forces of various currency de-
mands. A high level of monetary integration now exists in spite of the national
boundaries and national monetary monopolies. The various governments of
North America have provided, within limits, the atmosphere which has allowed
this state of integration to exist. This state of integration may not be optimal in
the sense of regional differences or in the sense of overall efficiency of money; how-
ever, given the national and regional priorities, it may be argued that North
America is an optimum currency area, with the provisos of regional and cultural
differences. To some extent, the national currency monopolies reflect these
provisos. If the costs of making the political choice to form one North American
currency area are too high, it certainly can be argued that the costs of ignoring the
natural level of financial integration in North America by any one of the national
monetary authorities are also too high.
4. See J. MURPHEY, THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEM (1979).
5. See Mundell, supra note 2, at 659-60.
6. This issue is discussed at length in Willet & Tower, 7he Concept of Optimum Currency Areas and the
Choice Between Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates, in APPROACHES TO GREATER FLEXIBILITY OF EXc:HANGE
RATES 407 (G. Hahm ed. 1970).
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The framework for the analysis in this article is derived from the recent litera-
ture on the monetary approach to international adjustment. This literature is
based upon the notion that balance of payments and/or exchange rates adjust to
accommodate the excess supply (demand) for money that may exist in an econ-
omy. It is useful to note that, in a sense, the model in this study internalizes the
external position in that it concentrates upon the relationship of external variables
(le., payments disequilibrium and exchange rate movements) to internal policy,
and thus provides a framework within which to measure monetary integration.
It is useful to review the underlying assumptions of the monetary model. First,
it is necessary that capital markets are sufficiently free to allow capital to flow
between countries so that the process of adjustment to imbalances in the supply or
demand for money can be made without restriction. This is certainly the case for
Canada and Mexico vis-A-vis the United States. Next, goods markets need to be
sufficiently integrated to allow goods prices to adjust. Although there are a few
barriers to trade, the United States is by far the most important trading partner of
Canada and Mexico. Moreover, Canada and Mexico are also significant trading
partners of the United States. A strong case can therefore be made for the proposi-
tion that these North American countries meet the required institutional criteria,
in a broad sense, to allow the general framework of the monetary approach to be
utilized.
Although this study will show that there exists a high level of monetary inte-
gration, it will also raise questions concerning areas where there is room for change
if more integration is desirable and will examine the costs of such changes. It is
concluded that the present level of monetary integration is very high, but could be
extended.
The study is divided into four parts. Section I gives an overview of the present
state of integration. The second section analyzes the underpinnings of the study's
general monetary theory-the relevant money demand functions-as they are re-
lated to monetary integration. The third section analyzes past monetary policy to
examine its thrust in light of the state of integration. Section IV details some areas
where further efforts are needed if a higher state of integration is to be achieved in
the 1980s.
I
THE PRESENT STATE OF INTEGRATION
The monetary integration of North America in the 1970s was the natural out-
come of the integration of Canada and Mexico with the United States in three
important areas: trade in goods and services, capital investment, and investment
in financial assets. Each of these dimensions of economic integration shall be
briefly reviewed to provide a perspective for the issues of monetary integration
which are discussed in the following sections.
A. Trade
Goods markets in Canada and Mexico are highly integrated with those of the
United States through foreign trade. In the case of Canada, as Figure I illustrates,
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the United States is by far the largest market for Canadian exports, accounting for
68 percent of the total volume of Canadian exports in 1979. For comparison, the
second largest market for Canadian exports is Europe, with 13 percent. The
United States is also the largest supplier of imported goods to Canada, accounting
for 72 percent of Canadian imports in 1979. 7
The auto pact between Canada and the United States is a good example of
goods manufacturing cooperation geared to furthering integration. Special rela-
tionships with regard to fishing, oil, and gas have been the basis of a well-inte-
grated production and distribution system between Canada and the United States
for years. Although some of these special relationships (especially with regard to
oil and gas) appear to be in some jeopardy at present because of renewed national-
istic feelings in Ottawa, the continual flow of goods and services across borders has
been, and remains, an essential consideration in policy decisions in both Canada
and the United States.
FIGURE I
CANADA'S MERCHANDISE TRADE FIGURES FOR 1979
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For Mexico, the United States provides the largest market for Mexican exports.
As Figure II illustrates, Mexican goods exported to the United States account for
about 70 percent of the total volume of Mexican exports. Once again for compari-
son, Europe is the second largest market, accounting for about 12 percent of Mex-
ico 's exports. The United States is also the largest supplier of Mexican imported
7. Data used by the authors are from Ini'l Fhancial Slaltsttcs, various issues.
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goods, accounting for 63 percent of the total volume of Mexican imports in 1979.
Europe is again the second largest, accounting for 21 percent. 8
FIGURE 2
MEXICO'S MERCHANDISE TRADE FIGURES FOR 1979
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This level of trade integration may be somewhat misleading in that it implies
that Mexico is fully utilizing the largest single export market in the world, the
United States. However, Mexico is not really an export-oriented country. By
comparison with the United States, considered the best example of a closed econ-
omy, Mexico earns very little of its gross domestic product (GDP) from exports.
This fact becomes increasingly obvious when we compare Mexico to another de-
veloping economy, Korea. Mexico has an export-to-GDP ratio of only 3.5 percent,
while Korea's ratio is almost 8 times as great at 27 percent. Export-oriented indus-
trialized economies such as Canada, Italy, and Germany all have higher export-to-
GDP ratios than Mexico. In the period following World War II, Mexico has be-
come an increasingly closed economy; until 1973, Mexican exports were growing
slower than GDP. This was just the opposite of the developed countries' case and,
in comparison to Korea, Mexico is clearly on a different growth path.
During the 1980s, Mexico should begin to see a growing proportion of its over-
all income derived from export-oriented industries, even under the present set of
laws governing its trade. Oil will certainly dominate this growth, but other infant
industries (for example, the steel industry) are becoming competitors in world mar-
8. Data used by the authors are from Direction of Trade Statistics, various issues.
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kets. With better development of the agricultural sector, combined with selective
lowering of barriers in the United States, Mexico could be in a position to gain
from investment in this sector. In summary, Mexico's.export capability is not in
the same position it would have been in if policies of import substitution had not
been implemented following World War II. However, some of the barriers to effi-
cient export production are being discarded with the realities of the 1970s and
1980s, and heretofore neglected sectors are again gaining the attention of policy-
makers. 9 With the discovery of potentially huge oil supplies, Mexico now faces the
problem of how best to utilize these revenues for growth, and how to avoid becom-
ing a one-product exporter. Certainly, the incorrect way to avoid this problem is
by abandoning the present efforts to tear down some of its trade barriers. At the
same time, Mexico must renew its efforts to make gains in the world's largest single
market, the United States.
For the United States, both Canada and Mexico figure prominently in the
market for imported and exported goods. As Figure III shows, the Canadian mar-
ket accounts for 18 percent of the total volume of the United States' exported
goods, while the Mexican market accounts for 5 percent. As a percentage of the
total volume of the United States' imported goods, Canadian imports account for
18 percent, while Mexican imports account for 4 percent. ' 0 Goods markets inte-
FIGURE 3
UNITED STATES' MERCHANDISE TRADE FIGURES FOR 1979
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gration is far from complete, but the large flow of goods and services as well as
labor across borders sets the stage for even greater integration in the future.
B. U.S. Capital Expenditures in Canada and Mexico
One important aspect of economic integration is the amount of non-financial
capital that flows between countries. Such investment in plant and equipment is a
long-term commitment that enhances productivity and stimulates real growth.
As Table I indicates, foreign affiliates of U.S. corporations invested heavily in
plant and equipment in both Canada and Mexico during 1979. The total volume
of such investment in 1979 for all countries amounted to $38 billion. Mexico's
share of this investment amounted to $630 million, or 2 percent, the majority of
which was invested in the transportation industry.
The investment by U. S. corporate affiliates in Canada was more pronounced.
In 1979, Canada's share amounted to $7.7 billion, or 20 percent of total capital
expenditures in all countries. Almost one-third of this investment was concen-
trated in the oil industry.
TABLE I
Capital Expenditures by Majority-Owned Foreign Affiliates
of U.S. Companies
1979
U.S. Total $38.1 B
Mexico
Total, all industries $0.60 B
Transportation Equipment $0.14 B
Canada
Total, all industries $7.7 B
Petroleum
Volume $2.43 B
Source: SURVEY CURRENT Bus. (Sept., 1980).
C. Financial Markets
To some extent, the integration of Canadian and Mexican financial markets
with those of the United States reflects the integration of trade and capital invest-
ment described above. However, much of the financial market integration has
developed as a response by investors to the development and maturation of or-
ganized financial markets in both Canada and Mexico.
One measure of financial market integration is the degree to which domestic
corporations, excluding commercial banks, hold financial liabilities of non-bank
corporations in foreign countries. In Table II, the outstanding financial claims on
Canadian and Mexican non-bank corporations by U. S. non-bank corporations is
provided for the end of 1979. The total amount of such claims for all foreign
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countries amounted to $17.5 billion. Of this total, 27 percent were claims on Ca-
nadian corporations, while only 1 percent represented claims on Mexican corpora-
tions.
In Table II, "Liabilities to Unaffiliated Foreigners" represents foreign non-
bank corporations' investment in the financial liabilities of U. S. non-bank corpo-
rations. At the end of 1979, the outstanding liabilities of these U.S. corporations to
foreign firms totaled $7.3 billion. Less than 1 percent of this amount was owed to
Canadian and Mexican corporations.
TABLE II
United States Claims and Liabilities on Unaffiliated Foreigners, c. 1979
End-of-Period
(billion U.S. $ %
End-of-Period) of Total
Claims on Unaffiliated
Foreigners, Total 17.5 -
(a) Canada 4.8 27.4
(b) Mexico 0.16 0.9
Liabilities to Unaffiliated
Foreigners, Total 7.3 -
(a) Canada 0.45 6.2
(b) Mexico 0.12 1.7
Source: FED. RES. BULL. (Sept., 1980).
The data in Table II are significant in that they represent an asymmetry in the
financial investment of U.S. and foreign non-bank corporations in each other.
U.S. non-bank corporations held more than twice as many financial liabilities of
foreign corporations (in dollar terms) as these corporations held of their U.S. coun-
terparts. This asymmetry is greatly magnified in the case of Canada, where U.S.
corporations held more than ten times the amount of liabilities of Canadian firms
that Canadian firms held of their U.S. counterparts. In the case of Mexico, the
dollar amounts of claims and liabilities were roughly the same, and quite small.
This particular asymmetry is interesting not only in that it represents a purely
financial integration of U.S. corporations' investment in Canadian firms, but also
in that the financial integration has real, non-financial, implications. In particu-
lar, the U.S. investment in Canadian firms' liabilities represents, to some degree,
U.S. financial support of the Canadian firms' non-financial assets, 1.e., plant,
equipment, and inventories.
For example, if a Canadian firm purchases a new machine, it pays for the
machine either from internally generated funds (in the form of accumulated prof-
its, depreciation, etc.), or it issues liabilities (in the form of bonds, commercial
paper, etc.), the proceeds of which are used for payment. Consequently, to the
extent that the Canadian firm issues liabilities to a U.S. firm in order to pay for the
machine, the U.S. firm has financed the purchase. As Table II shows, U.S. corpo-
rations have been much more willing to hold Canadian firms' liabilities than
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Canadian firms have been to hold the liabilities of U.S. firms. This financial asym-
metry may, in fact, represent a significant non-financial asymmetry as well.
More important from the point of view of this article, Canada utilizes the U.S.
financial (capital) markets at will. For example, the state of Alaska could be con-
sidered a capital importing state while the New York financial center could be
considered a capital exporting center. Canada has almost the same privileges as
Alaska. Though comparison may seem trite, the existence of a well-developed cap-
ital market for Canada in the United States(i*e. , New York) precludes the necessity
of equally developed markets being centered in Canada. The Canadian entrepre-
neur, just like his Alaskan counterpart, has access to this highly developed market.
Of course, this raises the question of national integrity of financial markets;
that is, Canadians, like Alaskans or Texans, are tied to a foreign (another state)
market in which to raise capital. However, the rationale for economic integration
is to allow relative comparative advantages to be fully exploited. New York pro-
vides this market to Alaska and also to Canada. As a caveat, this statement does
not belittle the financial centers of Montreal or Toronto in Canada; however, these
centers should be considered as regional centers in the whole North American mar-
ket as are Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, or, for that mat-
ter, New York.
The Mexican case is not quite as comparable since it is more isolated from the
other financial markets in the United States by structural impediments, as well as
by the difference in the level of development. But all one has to do is pick up the
CHART I
PERCENT OF CANADIAN MONEY SUPPLY HELD AS U.S. DOLLAR DEPOSITS
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directory of foreign banks in the United States to see that Mexico is operative in
the U.S. money centers. One may also note the large proportion of Mexican for-
eign debt held by U.S. banks, both those located within the United States and
those branches offshore.
Another measure of monetary integration, and probably the most important
measure, is based upon the acceptability of U.S. dollar deposits in Mexico and the
acceptability of U.S. dollar deposits in Canada. In both cases this phenomenon is,
in itself, a measure of how well integrated the monetary systems are. If there ex-
isted little or no integration, then it would be difficult to argue, from the perspec-
tive of a demander for money, that he or she should hold U.S. dollars if living in
Mexico or Canada.
Although this issue, called currency substitution, is more fully discussed in Sec-
tion III, Charts I and II present evidence of the high level of integration of monies
which already exists. In 1979, the percentage of total money in Canada and Mex-
ico (using broad measures of money) which was U.S. dollar denominated was well
over 10 percent. Though it could be argued that in Canada much of the demand
for U.S. dollars was from the corporate sector, this is certainly not the case in
Mexico. For Mexico, this measure is a very important illustration of just how well
the monetary systems are integrated despite language barriers, the disparity in the
relative development of the banking and financial systems, and the recent diver-
gence of monetary policies.
CHART 11
PERCENT OF MEXICAN MONEY SUPPLY HELD AS U.S. DOLLAR DEPOSITS
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For Mexico, Chart II also illustrates some other interesting points. Before 1975
only small amounts of money needed to be held in dollars by any Mexican since
the central bank was guaranteeing supply side substitutability; portfolio decisions
were not critical for the average Mexican vis-A-vis the two currencies. With the
devaluation of 1976 the situation quickly changed. People rushed out of pesos into
dollars in 1976 and 1977 as supply side substitutability was no longer guaranteed.
Their doing so, and remaining in dollars through today, suggests that demand side
substitutability now exists. The existence of demand side substitutability mitigates
the ability of the Bank of Mexico to actively use a monetary policy inconsistent
with that of the United States. The demand side has led to a greater degree of
integration.
II
MONETARY MODEL
Underlying the general monetary model of balance of payments and the ex-
change rate is the money demand function and its stability. It In this article, there
is little need to review relevant literature for the United States, Canada and Mex-
ico. However, important to this study are the implications for the monetary ap-
proach of the phenomenon of currency substitution.
This new set of literature, resulting from the work of Boyer' 2, points out that
there can be quantity adjustments as well as price adjustments arising from the
demand for currencies in a portfolio equilibrium framework.13 These adjustments
occur when people in country A can and do use.currency issued by country B as
well as their own "national" currency. For example, a Canadian may use U.S.
currency as well as Canadian dollars for purchases which may not be U.S. specific;
also, a Mexican holds U.S. currency as well as dollars for use in Mexico. Further,
both Canadians and Mexicans hold large dollar deposits in the United States. The
fact that both Mexicans and Canadians hold large percentages of their money in
the form of U.S. dollars in itself assures a certain degree of monetary integration.
In order to examine whether or not these diversified currency holdings are im-
portant in an economic sense, the relevant money demand function for Canada
11. See D. LAIDLER, THE DEMAND FOR MONEY: THEORIES AND EVIDENCES (1969); Akhtar & Put-
nam, Money Demand and Foreign Exchange Risk." The German Case, 1972-1976, 35 J. FINANCE 787 (1980);
Girton & Roper, A Monetary Model of Exchange Market Pressure Applied to the Postwar Canadian Erperience, 67
AM. ECON. REV. 537 (1977); Hamburger, The Demandfor Money in an Open Economy. Germany and the Unted
Kingdom, 3 J. MONETARY ECON. 25 (1977); Wilford, Some Observations on the Third World, in THlE MONE-
TARY APPROACH TO INTERNATIONAL ADJUSTMENT 98 (B. Putnam & D. Wilford eds. 1978) [hereinafter
cited as Putnam & Wilford].
12. See Boyer, Currency Mobili and Balance ofPayments Adjstment in Putnam & Wilford, supra note 11,
at 184. This work was first written as a working paper while Boyer was a student in 1972.
13. See, e.g., Girton & Roper, Theory and Implications of Currency Substtution, 13 J. Money, Credit and
Banking 12 (1981); King, Putnam & Wilford, A Currency Portfol Approach to Exchange Rate Determination."
Exchange Rate Stabihty and the Independence ofMonetary Pohcy, in Putnam & Wilford, supra note I1, at 199;
Miles, Currency Substitution, Flexible Exchange Rates, and Monetary Independence, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 428 (1978).
Another set of literature, that on competing monies, also relates closely to currency substitution. See F.
HAYEK, DENATIONALIZATION OF MONEY (1976); Klein, Competig Monies.- A Comment, 8 J. MONEY,
CREDIT & BANKING 513 (1976); Tullock, Competing Monies, 7 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 491 (1975).
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must be examined.' 4 If the money demand function is shown to be better specified
when the relevant definition of money includes U.S. deposits, then it can be ar-
gued that the concept of currency substitution has empirical meaning. Or, in the
context of this article, such a conclusion implies that the natural tendencies toward
integration through currency substitution have indeed already led to a certain and
statistically significant degree of integration.
Furthermore, since the specification of the demand for money function is of
central importance to a national central bank's ability to control domestic policy,
the conclusion that Canada's appropriate money demand function should include
U.S. dollars would be evidence that the policy would necessarily require de facto
integration of both the United States and Canadian financial systems. Failure to
do so would lead (and in the past has led) to results which could be detrimental to
the welfare of the general populace.' 5
A. The Model
General money demand literature is well summarized by Laidler.' 6 Following
this literature, we represent Canadian money demand as a function of domestic
real income, prices, and an appropriate interest rate,
Md = f(y,P,i), (1)
where Md denotes money demand, y denotes real domestic income, P denotes the
price level, and i denotes an interest rate. This general model can be modified to
include both Canadian and U.S. currency holdings,
Md = DMD + E'USMD, (2)
where DMD denotes demand for Canadian currency, USMD denotes demand for
U.S. currency, E denotes the spot exchange rate, or the price of a U.S. dollar in
terms of Canadian dollars. For DMD and USMP, the relevant money demand
functions are,
DMD = f(yD,PD,iD) and
USMD = f(YD,PD,iD,r), (3)
where r denotes the expected return to a Canadian from holding U.S. dollars.
The expected rate of return to a Canadian from holding U.S. dollars as op-
posed to Canadian dollars, r, can be expressed in various ways.' 7 In this article it
is assumed that financial capital is perfectly mobile so that (covered) interest rate
parity holds. Interest rate parity states that the interest differential between Cana-
14. In the case of Mexico, data problems precluded equivalent examination of the relevant demand
functions. For a general analysis of Mexican money demand see Wilford, supra note I1, at 112.
15. For Canada specific monetary analysis see T. COURCHENE, MONEY, INFLATION, ANt) THE BANK
OF CANADA; Cox, Some Empirical Evidence on an Incomplete Information Model of the Monetary Approach to the
Balance of Payments in Putnam & Wilford supra note 11, at 85.
16. D. LAIDLER, supra note 11.
17. For example, Girton and Roper express the expected returns from currency holdings as expected
real returns, which, by assuming relative purchasing power parity, uncovered interest rate parity, and
perfect foresight, yields the expected real return as the percentage change in the exchange rate. Girton &
Roper, supra note 13.
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dian and U.S. instruments of similar risk and maturity equal the premium on U.S.
dollars,
ican - iu, = (FE - E)/E, (4)
where ican' ius denote the Canadian and U.S. interest rates, respectively, and FE, E
denote the forward and current exchange rates, respectively. Equation (4) follows
from profit-maximization of individual investors unhampered by capital controls.
Given equation (4), investors would be indifferent in choosing between holding
U.S. or Canadian interest-bearing instruments of similar risk and maturity.
In order to analyze substitution between Canadian and U.S. dollars, however,
equation (4) can be interpreted in an alternative, though consistent, manner. In
order to obtain either currency, individual investors can sell instruments, either
assets or liabilities, of similar risk and maturity. If equation (4) holds and individ-
uals minimize expected opportunity or borrowing costs, then they will be indiffer-
ent in choosing between selling Canadian or U.S. assets. Alternatively, they will
be indifferent between issuing liabilities in Canadian or U.S. markets, in order to
obtain the desired currency.
Next, note that the variables in equation (4) are observable and known with
certainty at any point in time. There has been considerable literature analyzing
the relationship between the forward exchange rate and the expected (future) spot
rate. Following Putnam', we assume that the forward rate is not an unbiased
predictor of the expected spot rate. Indeed, the error in percentage terms of the
forward rate in predicting the spot rate yields the expected return to a Canadian
from holding U.S. dollars as opposed to Canadian dollars. If we let XE denote the
expected spot rate, then
r = (XE - FE)/E. (5)
As long as r is non-zero, then Canadian wealthholders would shift assets or
liabilities (given equation (4)) to obtain the desired currency holdings in order to
realize the expected return, r. Moreover, individuals may hold their expectations
of the future exchange rate with a great deal of uncertainty (which is generated by
external events). Incorporating this uncertainty, denoted by v, into the expected
return r, yields,
r = (XE - FE)/E + cv, (6)
where the (negative) constant cv denotes the effect on expected return r from a
change in uncertainty over the expected exchange rate.
Substituting (3) into (2) yields,
Md = f(YD,PD,iD) + E'f(YD,PD,iD,r). (7)
Choosing an exponential form, equation (7) can be represented as
M d =va~a 2 b b
M D D exp(a 3 iD) + E" YD1 Pb2 exp(-b 3 i) exp(b 4r). (8)
The percentage change of equation (8) given equation (6), and set equal to the
18. Putnam, Monetay Poh'c, Interest Rate Targets and Foreign Exchange Markets, in Putnam & Wilford
supra note 11, at 162.
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growth in total money supply, yields the stochastic (flow) monetary equilibrium
condition,
gM s = k~gY + k2gPD - k 3diD+
(USMDE/Mdk4 d (XE-FE)/E) + (USMDE/Md)ksdv + u, (9)
where Ms denotes total money supply, g the percentage change in X, dX the time
derivative of X and u a stochastic disturbance term. 19 Equation (9) states that the
growth in total money supply, consisting of Canadian dollars and U.S dollars,
equals the growth in total money demand. 20
B. Empirical Results
Equation (9) was estimated with quarterly data 1974 III to 1979 IV. The re-
sults are presented in Tables III-VI, with respect to the following variables:
Pc = annual percentage change in Canadian Consumer Price Index
(base = 1975). Source: International Financial Slatzstics (IFS).
P_ = annual percentage change in the Canadian Industry Selling
Price (base = 1975). Source: IFS.
i = annual difference in Canadian Long Term Government Yields.
Source: IFS.
r = ratio of U.S. $ denominated to total money supply times the
yearly difference in (XE-FE)/E where XE = spot rate at (t+3),
FE = 3 month forward rate at time t and E = spot rate at time t.
Source: IFS and Bank of America, San Francisco.
cv = ratio of U.S. $ denominated to total money supply times the
yearly difference of the quarterly variance of the DM/$ rate
(xl00) calculated with daily observations. Source: Bank of
America, San Francisco.
M: = annual percentage change in Canadian M 3 . (Quarterly data,
million C$). Source: Bank of Canada Review.
Ms = annual percentage change in total Canadian money supply com-
prised of M 3 plus U.S. $ demand and time deposits in U.S. banks
by Canadians and U.S. $ liabilities of Canadian Banks (deposits).
(Quarterly data, million C$). Source: Bank of Canada Revi'ew and
Treasury Bulletin.
19. It is important to note two aspects of our specification of equation (9). First, the constants ki are
not elasticities but are:
kI = (DMD/Md)aI + (USMDE/Md)b1 ,
k2 = (DMD/Md)a2 + (USMDE/Md)b2,
k3 = -(a 3 + b 3),
k4 = b 4, and
k5 = bc'=XF
Second, in specifying equation (9), we abstract from wealth effects on money demand arising from changes
in the exchange rate.
20. See Vaubel, International Shifts in the Demandfor Money, Their Ejects on Exchange Rates and Price Levels,
and Theizr Impliations for the Preannouncement of Monetag Expansion, 116 WELTWIRTSCHA--TLICHE.S ARCHIV 2
(1980).
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Y, = annualized percentage change in Canadian Real GNP at 1975
prices. (Quarterly data). Source: IFS.
Y2 = annualized percentage change in Canadian Real GNP as mea-
sured by nominal GNP deflated by the Canadian Consumer
Price Index. (Quarterly data). Source: IFS.
TABLE III
Money Constant P, Y, i
M 5.563
(1.12)
Ms  3.671
(0.81)
Ms  2.157
(0.45)
M, 4.819
(1.02)
0.783
(2.25)
0.818
(2.58)
0.898
(2.61)
0.723
(2.16)
1.221
(1.74)
1.830
(2.86)
2.048
(3.02)
1.690
(2.56)
-2.868
(-1.53)
-1.826
(-1.09)
-1.798
(-0.92)
-1.085
(-0.58)
r cv DW R 2 F
168.432
(0.92)
157.607
(0.92)
-40.874
(-1.89)
-40.183
(-1.85)
0.72 0.139 2.08
1.98 0.535 6.76
1.41 0.460 5.27
2.10 0.531 5.53
TABLE IV
Money Constant Pw Y r cv DW R 2  F
Me  11.963 0.312 0.365 0.57 0.075 1.82
(4.40) (1.89) (0.83)
M, 7.895 0.509 1.265 -46.640 1.64 0.530 8.53
(3.36) (3.59) (3.36) (-2.21)
M, 5.937 0.614 1.548 243.18 1.13 0.465 6.80
(2.38) (4.08) (3.85) (1.49)
M S  7.177 0.548 1.378 200.108 -42.792 1.96 0.551 7.12
(3.03) (3.86) (3.64) (1.33) (-2.05)
TABLE V
Money Constant Pw Y2 i r cv DW R 2 F
0.519
(4.00)
0.415
(4.06)
0.428
(4.16)
0.46
(4.01)
0.811
(5.14)
1.098
(7.55)
1.095
(8.60)
1.166
(7.06)
-2.371
(-2.72)
-0.750
(-1.11)
-0.972
(-1.27)
-1.196
(-1.41)
-80.270
(-0.77)
-96.119
(-0.89)
7.672
(0.52)
10.565
(0.69)
0.93 0.603 11.14
1.76 0.846 28.51
1.72 0.849 29.17
1.75 0.844 22.67
M c  9.152
(6.34)
M.s 9.325
(7.65)
M s  9.284
(8.11)
M s  8.787
(6.42)
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TABLE VI
Money Constant P_ Y2 r cv DW R 2  F
Me  11.579 0.266 0.610 0.77 0.462 9.59
(8.76) (2.53) (3.76)
M, 10.229 0.330 1.009 2.310 1.58 0.844 37.10
(11.20) (4.85) (8.26) (0.16)
M, 10.229 0.330 1.010 -5.755 2.293 1.57 0.834 26.20
(10.87) (4.69) (7.97) (-0.06) (0.16)
M, 10.287 0.328 0.999 -6.017 1.58 0.844 37.05
(12.24) (4.88) (9.59) (-0.07)
In Tables III and IV, the measure Y, of real income growth was utilized. Ta-
bles V and VI report the results from utilizing the measure Y2. Also, two specifica-
tions of money demand (for both measures of money) were estimated. In Tables
III and V, the nominal interest rate variable i was included in the estimations,
while in Tables IV and VI it was not.
The empirical results clearly support the hypothesis that U.S. dollars are im-
portant in a proper specification of money demand in Canada. First, the reported
F-ratio for the total money demand estimation is consistent with the hypothesis
that variation in money demand is better explained by including U.S. dollars in
the Canadian demand for money. In all specifications of money demand, the F-
ratio, or the ratio of explained variance to unexplained variance, is much higher
for total money demand than for money demand for Canadian dollars only.
Second, the estimated coefficient for the inflation variable is larger for total
money demand than the demand for Canadian dollars in 16 of 24 estimations,
while the estimated coefficient for the growth in real income variable is larger in all
estimations of total money demand compared to the demand for Canadian dollars.
These results indicate that both Canadian dollars and U.S. dollars are highly sub-
stitutable for transactions purposes within Canada.
For example, the (estimated) coefficient k, (from equation (9)) reflects the sum
of two factors, 2 1 the weight of each currency and the elasticity of each currency
with respect to real income,
k, = (DMD/Md)a, + (USMD E/Md "b,, (10)
where the right hand side of equation (10) is derived from taking the growth rate
of equation (8) with respect to real income. Note that for estimating the demand
for Canadian dollars,
DMD/Md = 1 and USMD'E/Md = 0, (11)
While for estimating total Canadian money demand,
DMD/Md + USMD'E/Md = 1. (12)
Consequently, to the extent that k, (and k 2) are larger for total money demand
than for the demand for Canadian dollars, the ratio of U.S. dollars to the total
21. See note 19.
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money supply and the elasticity of the demand for U.S. dollars with respect to real
income (the price level) will be positive, indicating therefore a substitutability of
U.S. dollars for Canadian dollars for transactions purposes.
Finally, characteristics such as the degree of autocorrelation suggest that a
money demand specification which does not include U.S. dollars is omitting vari-
ables. If policy is made without consideration of U.S. dollar denominated money,
then clearly such policy will be pursued in an atmosphere of incomplete informa-
tion.
III
PAST MONETARY POLICY
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in
1973, supply side substitutability has been induced by the foreign exchange mar-
ket intervention policies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States. As demon-
strated in the last section, a high degree of substitutability on the demand side has
existed between Canadian and U.S. dollars within Canada. It is also the case that
substitutability in demand has existed between the U.S. dollar and the peso within
Mexico during the same period. Chart II is one illustration of this phenomenon.
There are important policy implications of currency substitution, whether it
comes from the supply side, through government foreign exchange market inter-
vention, or from the demand side, through portfolio preferences of private individ-
uals. In this section, the role of past monetary policies of Canada, Mexico, and the
United States is discussed in the context of the integration of these countries'
money markets. In particular, the U.S. dollar's role in both supply substitutability
and demand substitutability has undermined the ability of Canadian and Mexi-
can monetary authorities to pursue policies that significantly diverge from those of
the United States.
A. Supply Side Substitutability
Government foreign exchange market intervention is pursued with the goal of
maintaining exchange rates within an accepted targeted range. The narrowest
range, of course, is that of a fixed or constant exchange rate, whereby an identical
ceiling and floor are placed on the price of foreign exchange. In this case, any
private excess supply. or demand for domestic money is satisfied by the monetary
authorities buying and selling domestic money for foreign exchange. It is this type
of goal that characterized foreign exchange market intervention from the time of
the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1946 until its breakdown in March 1973.
Since 1973, however, governments have generally allowed exchange rates to be
determined by market "fundamentals", i.e., their perceptions of the economic in-
fluences which determine exchange rates in the long run. If, in the short run,
exchange rates deviated substantially from these fundamentals, governments inter-
vened in foreign exchange markets to "manage" exchange rates or "smooth" these
disruptive (and thought to be temporary) disturbances.
Whether exchange rates are fixed or whether they are managed, any amount of
government foreign exchange market intervention is tantamount to a substitution
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by the authorities of domestic money for foreign exchange. In the case of a fixed
exchange rate, this substitutability in supply is perfect-a particular amount of
domestic money is convertible into an equivalent amount of foreign exchange at a
fixed price. 2 2 In the case of managed floating, the substitutability in supply is
imperfect-currencies are inconvertible at a fixed price, but convertible only dur-
ing various time periods at uncertain prices.
Whether the authorities' goal is a fixed exchange rate or a managed floating
exchange rate, the effect of inducing substitutability is to integrate the domestic
country's money market with that of the foreign currency. However, and more
importantly, supply side substitutability may or may not undermine the authori-
ties' ability to pursue a policy different from that of the foreign country. A coun-
try's monetary independence depends on its central bank's portfolio
management-the central bank's response to the increase or decrease in its assets
brought about by the foreign exchange market intervention. 23
B. Central Bank Portfolio Management
Whenever the authorities intervene in foreign exchange markets, both the asset
and liability sides of the central bank's balance sheet are affected simultaneously.
If the authorities purchase foreign exchange, their assets are increased by the
amount of foreign exchange acquired. Correspondingly, in the act of purchasing
foreign exchange, they create an equivalent amount of liabilities, z'e., the amount
of domestic money created to purchase the foreign exchange.
On the other hand, a sale of foreign exchange simultaneously decreases their
assets and liabilities. 24 Their assets decline by the amount of the sale of foreign
exchange and an equivalent volume of liabilities is destroyed as the domestic
money (which the public exchanged for their purchase of foreign money) is retired.
Most important, the authorities' purchase of foreign exchange increases the
domestic money supply (domestic money is created to purchase the foreign ex-
change) and decreases the foreign money supply (the amount of foreign exchange
purchased is a decline in the amount of foreign money held by the public). Alter-
natively, the authorities' sale of foreign exchange decreases the domestic money
supply (domestic money held by domestic residents declines) and increases the for-
22. Fixed exchange rates are discussed within the context of supply side substitutability in Miles, supra
note 13.
23. For a discussion of the independence issue under a fixed rate system with a dollar reserve currency
see Girton & Henderson, Financial Capital Movements and Central Bank Behavior in a T77o-Country, Short-Run
Portfolo Balance Model, 2 J. MONETARY ECON. 33 (1976); Putnam & Wilford, Money, Income and Causality in
the United States and The United Kiigdam: A Theoretical Explanation of Different Findings, 68 AM. ECON. RE'.
423 (1978), reprinted in Putnam & Wilford supra note 11, at 65.
24. It is interesting that the meaning of "liabilities" of a central bank is not the same as that which
denotes a liability of a private market participant. In the United States, for example, a commercial bank is
"liable" for its liabilities, i.e., it "promises" to honor its deposits in terms of convertibility into Federal
Reserve notes. On the other hand, the Federal Reserve is liable to convert Federal Reserve notes into
Federal Reserve notes. The "convertibility" aspect of a liability, when applied to a central bank, is a carry-
over from the days of the gold standard when central bank notes were convertible into the commodity
gold.
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eign money supply (the amount of foreign money held by the public is increased
by the amount of foreign exchange sold).
Thus, by changing the domestic and foreign money supplies and by affecting
the central banks' assets and liabilities simultaneously, foreign exchange market
intervention sets into motion factors which will induce changes in aggregate de-
mand both domestically and abroad. In this case, the substitutability in supply
induced by foreign exchange market intervention not only integrates domestic and
foreign money markets, but integrates domestic and foreign economies-a
purchase of foreign exchange increases the domestic money supply and decreases
the foreign money supply, thus putting upward pressure on domestic prices and
income and downward pressure on foreign prices and income.
However, whether or not foreign exchange market intervention affects both
domestic and foreign economies depends, in fact, on the portfolio strategy of the
central bank which intervenes. For example, suppose that the domestic authorities
purchase foreign exchange in the foreign exchange market. Since the foreign ex-
change acquired through market intervention is non-interest-bearing, the authori-
ties, desiring to maximize their interest income, could purchase foreign interest-
bearing assets in the foreign country's financial markets. This basic portfolio deci-
sion, stemming from a desire to obtain interest on assets acquired through foreign
exchange market intervention, mitigates the effect of the foreign exchange market
intervention on the foreign economy. 25 In exchanging the acquired foreign ex-
change for interest-earning foreign assets, the initial decline in the foreign coun-
try's money supply is offset by an equivalent increase-the foreign money is
reintroduced into the economy by the exchange of foreign money for foreign secur-
ities.
The analysis can be carried one step further. Suppose that the domestic au-
thorities intervene by buying foreign exchange, and convert the proceeds of their
intervention into securities in the foreign country's financial markets. The domes-
tic economy still experiences inflationary pressures since domestic money was cre-
ated for the initial purchase of foreign exchange. Since the foreign economy is
unaffected, the domestic economy bears all of the adjustment in prices, income,
etc., from the domestic authorities' exchange market intervention. Anj distur-
bance originating in the foreign country which puts pressure on the foreign ex-
change markets affects the domestic economy through the authorities' intervention
to maintain a constant or stable exchange rate. As long as the domestic authorities
continue to convert the foreign exchange into foreign securities, the foreign coun-
try is insulated from the "international" effects of the disturbance which
originated in their country.
It is this supply side substitutability and central bank portfolio behavior that
characterized North America during most of the period since the late 1940s. In
particular, Canadian and Mexican purchases (sales) of U.S. dollars in the foreign
exchange market were converted into (out of) U.S. interest-earning assets, the ma-
25. Both Girton & Henderson, supra note 23, and Putnam & Wilford, supra note 23, show that in the
reserve currency case the foreign economy (if it is the reserve currency country) is fully insulated.
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jority of which were Treasury obligations. While Canadian, Mexican, and U.S.
money markets were linked through foreign exchange market intervention, the
linkage was unidirectional with respect to the economies of Canada, Mexico and
the United States. U.S. policies and economic disturbances induced adjustment in
the Canadian and Mexican economies, with little or no feedback.
In the case of Canada, Canadian authorities intervened to fix the Canadian
dollar vis-.-vis the U.S. dollar during the period of 1962 to June 1970. During the
periods 1952 to 1962 and June 1970 to 1974, the Canadian authorities allowed the
value of their currency to be determined by the foreign exchange market. Since
1974, however, the authorities have intervened intermittently to maintain "orderly
conditions" in the foreign exchange market.
There is considerable empirical evidence that during the periods when the Ca-
nadian authorities have intervened, they have been unable to pursue policies
which diverged from those of the United States. In particular, if the Canadian
authorities attempted to increase the Canadian money supply by 10 percent, they
would induce a 9.5 percent decline in the Canadian money supply in foreign ex-
change market intervention to support the Canadian dollar.
26
In the case of Mexico, supply side substitution was guaranteed by the fixed
exchange rate system imposed by the authorities in 1954.27 The Mexican authori-
ties pursued a policy which ensured that their domestic policy would be subject to
the world's policy or, as in the case of Canada, to the United States's monetary
policy. Wilford and Zecher sum up the 1954-1976 period study:
First, it is a relatively small economy that faces prices for goods and capital that are deter-
mined on world markets, and over which it has little control. Second, though considered an
underdeveloped country, Mexico has a relatively advanced financial structure headed by a
central bank, which, over most of the period, was concerned with the external balance (the
balance of payments) as well as internal economic development....
For both political and economic reasons, one of the most important goals for
Mexican monetary policy was the maintenance of a fixed exchange rate. To main-
tain the stable exchange rate and to achieve the goals of stable prices and of help-
ing to finance government expenditures, certain monetary policy guidelines,
although not legislated, were followed by the authorities during the late fifties and
sixties. First, the government would increase its deficit spending only at a rate that
was equal to or just greater than the rate of real economic growth. Second, money
supply expansion would take place at a rate only slightly greater than real eco-
nomic growth.
These guidelines were pervasive in the conduct of monetary policy during the
period; they enabled the central bank to fulfill the financing tasks without injec-
tions of domestically created money that were excessive relative to real growth.
26. Girton & Roper, supra note 11, at 544.
27. See D. WILFORD, MONETARY POLICY AND THE OPEN EcONOMY: MEXIcO's EXPERIENCE (1977).
For the interested reader this book fully analyzes the impact of the Mexican exchange rate policy on
domestic monetary policy and vice versa. See also Wilford & Zecher, Monetary Pohy and the Balance of Pay-
ments in Mexico, /955-75, 11 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 340 (1979); Wilford & Wilford, Monelary Ap-
proach to the Balance of Payments: On World Prices and the Reserve Flow Equation, 113 WELTWIRTSCIAFI-LICHES
ARCHiv 31 (1977).
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But with the world's money supply and prices increasing rapidly in the late sixties
and early seventies, the ability of the central bank to restrain monetary expansion
diminished and, abandoning the first guideline in late 1972. . . as we will see, was
a crucial factor leading to the 1976 de facto devaluation of the peso. 28
Indeed, Mexico saw itself as "the Switzerland of Latin America," a safe haven
for investment and foreign savings. The cornerstone (until the middle seventies) of
their overall policy-as stated above-was convertibility, at no risk, of pesos for
dollars. Thus, in following such a policy, their residents enjoyed the benefits of
supply side substitutability. The cost of the policy was the Central Bank's yielding
of its domestic monetary policy decisions to the Federal Reserve. As will be noted
later, the decision to follow a separate course in the seventies led to the financial
turmoil of 1976-1977.
C. Demand Substitutability
When private individuals in a country diversify their portfolios with various
currencies, portfolio adjustments induce changes in money supplies between coun-
tries. This demand substitutability integrates not only the respective countries'
money markets, but their economies as well. This integration occurs without the
authorities' intervention in the foreign exchange markets. 29
To see how the monetary and economic integration reveals itself, it is useful to
review briefly the interaction of interest rates, exchange rates, and money growth,
which is well documented in economic theory and discussed in Section II. Briefly,
if the monetary authorities in a country boost interest rates unilaterally, money
growth will be restricted and the forward-exchange premium on the country's cur-
rency will be raised as a result of arbitrage. If the foreign exchange market is
convinced that the low money growth will hold, the currency will strengthen in the
spot market. By the same token, a change in expectations about money growth
(and inflation) will tend to affect the exchange rate and interest rate. For example,
if a shock-such as sharply higher oil prices-triggers expectations of a weaker
currency and higher inflation, then the forward-exchange market will reflect this
expectation. Subsequently, either interest rates or the spot exchange rate-de-
pending upon whether either variable was fixed by official policy-would adjust to
the shift in expectations through the opportunities presented by arbitrage.
The interaction of these market forces is heightened by the special relationship
between the U.S. and Canadian currencies and by the integration of their capital
markets. Although the relationship is not one of perfect substitutability in which
interest and inflation rates would have to be the same and the spot exchange rate
fixed, the high degree of substitutability still demands that the monetary policies of
the two countries converge. For example, if Canada were to pursue a more expan-
sionary policy than that of the United States, the currency substitution phenome-
non would mean that Americans would also borrow Canadian dollars. This would
not affect the exchange market, however, since market participants (in the United
28. Wilford & Zecher, supra note 27, at 340-41.
29. The effect of currency substitution on monetary independence is discussed in Miles, supra note 13.
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States and Canada) would continue to accept Canadian dollars in lieu of U.S.
dollars with the anticipation of an eventual change in Canadian policy to conform
with that of the United States. Thus, the substitutability actually helps delay the
exchange rate effects of divergent policy. But if expectations suddenly change so
that the market comes to believe that Canadian policy will continue to diverge,
then the demand for Canadian dollars would fall and their exchange value would
drop sharply.
The point can best be illustrated by the recent behavior of these market vari-
ables. Following the November 1978 actions by the U.S. government to support
the American dollar, the Canadian currency gained rather than lost ground
against the newly strengthened U.S. dollar. This is because the markets ex-
pected-and soon got-a similar Canadian policy package. Indeed, no loss of Ca-
nadian dollar value was needed, as expectations buoyed the Canadian dollar until
the response came.
A second illustration is perhaps more interesting. On October 6, 1979, the
United States assembled another dollar-support package. The Canadian dollar's
value exceeded the U.S. dollar's value by $0.85 at the time. For four days the rate
held fairly steady. Then the market became concerned about a possible reluctance
on the part of the Canadian authorities to match the U.S. interest rate moves,
triggering a sharp drop in the Canadian currency's value. It rebounded after the
Canadian authorities introduced a similar policy formula, but the bounce-back
took longer since some of the market's confidence in the Canadian authorities'
responsiveness was eroded.
It appears that any effort on the part of the Canadian authorities to diverge
permanently from an interest rate policy followed by the United States will lead
not to mild or gradual depreciation or appreciation, but rather to sharp move-
ments in the Canadian currency's value. Brief divergences in interest-rate policy,
however, are tolerated and even accommodated by the exchange market as the
capital markets, owing to currency substitutability, absorb potential exchange rate
pressures. The market thus serves as a stern taskmaster, demanding in the long
run that Canadian and U.S. policymakers follow similar paths, but forgiving short
run divergences.
Currency substitution on the demand side between the peso and the U.S. dol-
lar is best illustrated by what happened following the September 1976 devaluation
of the peso. Again referring to chart II, one notes that once the devaluation took
place, demanders of money were placed in a position of having to worry about
their portfolios of dollars versus pesos. The result has been a sharp rise in the
percentage of money held in the form of dollars. This "dollarization" problem
forced the Bank of Mexico to exercise discipline (at times extreme) in 1977 and
1978, or the financial turmoil of early 1977 would have once again engulfed them.
A description of the period following the September devaluation is informa-
tive. The Central Bank announced floating on September 1. In about two weeks
the markets moved to a spot rate of about 19.5. During this'period many prices
which before had been in pesos and dollars now were being quoted in dollars only.
The Central Bank then repegged the currency, thinking the markets had settled on
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a "proper" rate. This took away the risk of demanders moving further into dollars
since market participants correctly realized that the peso could not be revalued
upward by the authorities from 19.5. This created a one-sided private market as
dollars were supplied for pesos by the authorities at the pegged rate. After deplet-
ing its reserves, the Central Bank again had to allow the peso to float; that is, it
had to again allow the market to find a new equilibrium. The rate went well
above 25 pesos/dollar before settling into the 22.8-23 range. At this point-after
several months of financial uncertainty-stability again returned to the cross rate
and active supply side integration could in fact help to fix the rate, though not
officially as with the pegged rate. On the demand side, individuals were no longer
indifferent in choosing between pesos and dollars. The existence of the alternative
money forced the authorities to pursue a policy which would once again make the
peso attractive to hold at a relatively stable 22.8 to 23 pesos per dollar level.
The recent divergences between the policies of the Bank of Mexico and the
Federal Reserve System, given the existence of the "dollarization" vehicle through
currency substitution, suggest that another major realignment of the currencies is
in the offing, unless the Bank of Mexico reverses much of its present set of policies.
IV
THE FUTURE
As noted above, there already exists a great deal of monetary integration due to
demand side factors. As markets have become more exposed to the financial tur-
moils of the late 1970s and early 1980s, portfolio holders, corporate as well as indi-
vidual, have had to gain more financial expertise, thereby utilizing foreign as well
as domestic options for financing inventories or denominating wealth (debt). This
trend should continue through the decade. The restructuring of the world
financial system, which began in the late sixties and early seventies and has been
exacerbated by the OPEC (Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries) sur-
plus with its huge recycling problems, will continue with or without official help.
More important, the existence of currency substitution will limit how far the au-
thorities can deviate from each other's policies, thereby ensuring more integration
The maturing of financial markets under a flexible exchange rate system, as
well as development of Euromarkets, provides the vehicles necessary for market
participants to move toward a more integrated approach on the demand side. The
seventies have provided a great deal of experience for participants in the market,
thus laying the foundation for further efforts in the eighties.
Technological as well as human capital development during the eighties will
be one area which will necessitate further monetary integration. The ability of
markets to transmit, filter, and use information will increase the risk to those not
doing so. Thus, in a competitive money market, international alternatives will be
more forthcoming, particularly for North America, which is on the cutting edge of
the intellectual and technological efforts as applied to money markets.
Our experience from the seventies, the existence of market vehicles, and a tech-
nological shrinking of the world (in an informational sense), are all demand side
considerations. On the supply side, the areas for meaningful integration are sev-
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eral. First, the necessity for the market to lead toward integration could be some-
what eliminated by a return to a fixed exchange rate system on the North
American continent. Free convertibility already exists; thus, such a move would
not entail a great deal of new operative legislation. However, as noted, this would
undermine the policy alternatives of each national authority. Of course, as has
been shown, these alternatives may be few unless the authorities are willing to
permit large movements in their relative exchange rates.
This turn of events is unlikely to occur, but with the exception of new potential
crises in Mexico, close cooperation among the three Central Banks will likely con-
tinue. The cooperation will continue to be in the form of intervention strategy and
swap arrangements, but as noted, these efforts are viewed as not being very mean-
ingful. Real cooperation can come about only in some form of policy coordina-
tion. It would be ludicrous for Canada to run a monetary policy ignoring that of
the United States-the effects on the exchange markets and inflationary impulses,
as well as the real economies, would be manifold. By the same token, the Mexican
experience of 1976-1977 should be an indicator of the costs of deviating too far
from a set of general North American policies.
Since both Canada and Mexico will continue to be the junior partners on the
continent, the U.S. authorities have a responsibility to them to consider their needs
before committing to a policy course. Such a sense of responsibility often has been
lacking in the past.
On the supply side, one area which needs work if full integration is to be
achieved is the structure of banking that now exists on the continent. Each coun-
try has created a rigid set of banking laws which have hindered the market's efforts
to move to a more integrated state. For example, Canada's new banking laws
severely limit the-ability of foreign banks to grow in Canada, although the laws at
least recognize different standards for required reserve behavior than do regional
banks. In Mexico, foreign banks are treated quite differently from domestic banks.
The United States is not immune to archaic banking regulations, but at least the
discrimination tends to be unidirectional. City banks are penalized by having dif-
ferent standards for required reserve behavior than do regional banks; state bank-
ing laws protect inefficient banks in certain areas; regulatory laws distort financial
markets. The point is that the structure of financial intermediation in the United
States, as well as in Canada and Mexico, will have to be changed in a legislative
sense if a more fully integrated structure is to emerge. Barring this, the market will
probably devise ways around the existing structure. Such market initiatives could
be facilitated by legislative action; and, of course, they could be frustrated by new
impeding legislation as well.
The eighties offer great potential for more active financial market integration
on the continent. Advocates of a more integrated market will move in that direc-
tion with or without government action. Portfolio maximization behavior will re-
flect the new realities of monetary integration but in the face of, at a minimum,
token monetary authority responses. However, for governments to give up their
nationalistic feelings toward money creation, or for governments to de-monopolize
money, the benefits from doing so would have to be far greater than they are now
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perceived as being. Thus, we conclude that the 1980s will witness further integra-
tion on monetary and financial matters, but the integration will most likely occur
in spite of, not because of, intergovernmental relationships and cooperation. More
important, the existence of currency substitution will limit how far the authorities
can deviate from each other's policies, thereby ensuring more integration.

